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This paper estimates homicide rates and describes the nature of violence and crime 
for Cambodia. Limited data allows only a partial picture of the trends and nature of 
lethal violence. Post-war economic adversity combined with a weak state and 
underdeveloped “legal culture” contributed to an elevated rate of homicide. Frequent 
acts of murder-robbery, mayhem, political violence and banditry present a major 
threat to social and economic development.  A murder incident rate of approximately 
5.7 per 100,000 but a homicide rate of 9.3 per 100,000 was estimated for 1996, higher 
than most countries in the region except the Philippines. Political and economic 
adversity drove the homicide rate to 11.6 per 100,000 in 1998 similar to levels 
reached during 1993 the year of the first national elections. Usually homicides were 
between males and commonly arose from robbery, disputes and quarrels with most 
deaths resulting from gunfire. Extra-judicial death arising from police or “mob” 
actions accounted for high rates of suspect/offender death and contributed 
significantly to the homicide rate. Rates of violent crime were higher in rural areas 
but Phnom Penh experienced higher levels of property crime than the provinces. The 
homicide rate is compared with neighbouring countries and the roles of 






An apocryphal photograph of the Cambodian countryside shows a signpost on a 
roadside bend outside of Phnom Penh which in Khmer reads,  “Please do not dump 
body in this padi-field”. Cambodia’s reputation as one of the most lethal places in the 
world is perhaps justly earned. However, a decade after the 1991 Paris Accords, the 
departure of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia [UNTAC] and 
the establishment of the Royal Government of Cambodia [RGC] how violent is 
Cambodia? How does lethal violence in Cambodia compare with that in other 
Association of South East Asian Nations [ASEAN], developed and developing 
countries? Is Cambodia’s violent image still justified?i
 
The impact of revolutionary genocide, combined with poverty, fragmented 
institutions, the stress of post-war reconstruction an armed society and a weak “rule 
of law” state produced more acts of mayhem, extra-judicial homicide and murder-
robbery in Cambodia than its neighbours. These forms of homicide exceeded 
homicide between intimates. The level of violence in Cambodia may not exceed that 
of all other countries but it is certainly more lethal attaining apotheosis. The nature of 
lethal violence is a mixture of the ordinary and the bizarre. The following, Khmer 
newspaper accounts illustrateii: 
 
April 23 Phnom Penh: Oul Phally, 33, was killed by robbers who stole her motorcycle on 
Street 318, Chamcarmon district. They shot her when she tried to speed up her motorcycle to 
get away. The offenders escaped with the victim's motorcycle 
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April 22 Kampong Cham Province: One person was killed and 32 wounded when a grenade 
exploded in the dancing place in Kok Sro Lauv village. So Van, believed to be the man who 
dropped the grenade, was killed in the blast. The source said that Van was very drunk and 
took the grenade from his waist and held it in his hand and certainly the grenade dropped and 
exploded 
 
April 30: Two robbers were killed by a mob of people and the militia at Choum Chav 
precinct on the outskirts of Phnom Penh after they robbed a moto-taxi driver who was hired 
from Phnom Prosith. The source said the robbers hit the moto-taxi driver's neck and took the 
moto and sped away. But suddenly an angry crowd appeared because they heard the cries of 
the victim. 
 
May 17: Hem Chandara, a robber was killed by military police after they brought him to 
show where his accomplice was, at Sangkat Toul Sang Ke, Khan Toul Kok. A source said he 
jumped from the car and tried to escape but military police shot to threaten him but unluckily 
the bullets hit the offender. 
 
May 30 Phnom Penh: Ngweng Minh, 27, a Vietnamese man was killed after a group of moto-
taxi drivers stopped him and beat him after he robbed one moto-taxi on Kampuchea Krom 
Blvd. 
 
June 18 Kampong Cham: A commune policeman, Seng Kheavuth, was shot dead while he 
was swinging his son to sleep in his house in Tongrong commune, Prey Chhor district. Three 
unidentified men shot him with an AK-47 from under his wooden house and then escaped. A 
commune authority said that this was a revenge crime as there was nothing stolen. 
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July 4 Phnom Penh: Neang Sophea, 25, was chopped on his neck then shot to death by his 
girlfriend, Heng Sochea, in Kandal market. Sochea, 27, then shot herself to death with the 
same handgun. A letter found in her pocket by police said that she fell in love with Sophea on 
Nov 15, 1996, and later learned that he escaped from her to have another girl. 
 
Aug 2: The body of an unidentified man was found in Koki Thom commune, Kien Svay 
district, Kandal. A newspaper reported that the victim had been killed and dumped at the site 
within the past few days because the body was very swollen. Investigations were continuing. 
 
Sept 16: A body of an unidentified man was found in a pond in Phnom Penh Thmei precinct, 
Russei Keo district by a fisherman. The victim was shot and weighted with stone and dumped 
into the pond. 
 
This paper estimates the prevalence and describes the nature of homicide in the 
Kingdom of Cambodia. An attempt is made to theorise about the nature of violence in 
the context of the formation of crucial state capacities and institutions and the 




Cambodia’s  “re-organisation episode” offers an opportunity to observe the nature of 
crime following a state induced “collective disaster”, market reforms iii  and the 
transformation of socioeconomic relations (Evans, Rueschemeyer & Skocpol 
1985:364). The political settlement that led to the re-creation of a constitutional 
monarchy in 1993 also brought about the formation of a new state whose law and 
order institutions did not enjoy public support and legitimacyiv.  The absence of an 
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established legal culture also restricted the ability of the new state to competently 
assert a consistent and credible legal threat to crime, illegality and disorder. 
Nevertheless, Cambodia is not lawless, neither are its policing institutions totally 
without any general deterrent effect. The Cambodian experience may also help 
criminologists to assess the general relevance of policing institutions in suppressing 
crime and producing order. Of theoretical interest is the nature of crime engendered 
by weak state institutions in the context of strong communal and non-state forces.  
Parenthetically, Cambodia reveals conditions of pre-modernity in the context of post-
industrialisation,  to which the advanced capitalist state may revert if stripped of the 
apparatus and symbolism of the "rule of law". When state regulation is weak, and 
private and customary regulation strong, what sorts of crime prosper?  
 
Cambodia is still in the crucial stages of state formation following decades of war, 
genocide, insurrection and widespread civil dislocation and experiences crime and 
homicides different to those found in established states. Is crime, especially homicide, 
a sensitive barometer of social change and good governance? Does the level of 
violence reflect the stresses of a shattered economy and weakened human capital, or a 
culture of impunity based on an enduring  “Realpolitik” of violence created by 
decades of conflict? Cambodia offers an opportunity to observe how in the process of 
state formation the establishment of a criminal justice system impacts on the nature 
and volume of crime. However, to address these questions we must first take into 




Archer and Gartner (1976:960) in a seminal review of the effects of war on homicide 
rates demonstrated that substantial increases in homicide were observed [irrespective 
of the outcome of the conflict], and that high combat losses predicted higher levels of 
post-war homicide. They tested several explanatory models and concluded that a 
“Legitimation of Violence” model which predicted an increase in homicide “…as a 
result of the pervasive war-time presence of officially sanctioned killing” best fitted 
the data. Other explanations such as the “Social Solidarity” and “Cartharsis” or war 
fatigue models which predicted decreases or returns to normal levels of homicide 
were rejected. Alternative explanations for higher post-war homicide rates arising 
from distressed post-war economies, return of violent veterans or demographic 
changes also failed to account for the increases observed. Our ability to test these 
explanations for Cambodia is necessarily limited because of the destruction of almost 
all government records during the revolutionary period. Consequently, no reliable 
crime data exist pre-war [before 1970] and what is available is poorly defined and 
ambiguous (Wilson 2001:52-55). French colonial records are also incomplete but 
suggest that crime, especially homicide, was extremely rare during the protectorate 
period [1902-1954]. This appeared to remain so until the mid-1960s when political 
violence, civil disorder and mounting pressure from the Vietnam War engulfed 
‘peaceful’ Cambodia v.  
 
Despite the scant picture of pre-war crime, we do know that Cambodia has been 
exposed to an extended ‘legitimation of violence’. We may argue in accordance with 
Archer and Gartner’s thesis, that war (and revolutionary) violence legitimated by the 
state carried into higher peacetime homicide. Indeed the very high rate of 
suspect/offender death may better reflect this process of violence legitimisation than 
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general levels of homicide and, is in accord with many Khmer attitudes to violent 
death (Chandler 1993; Keirnan 1996; Wilson 2001). Police and citizens alike 
commonly remark: “in Pol Pot time life was very cheap”; “criminals are merciless 
and must be killed”; “we must save ourselves because they [the state] are corrupt” or; 
“people are the law and must have justice”. Therefore, lawlessness and the activities 
of vigilantes are attributed by Khmer to the brutalisation experienced during the civil 
war [1970-1975], revolutionary period [1975-79] and occupation by Vietnam [1979-
1989]. However, the processes of state formation and modernisation also play an 




Theories of Crime, Modernisation and Development 
 
We have some theoretical guidance about the nature of crime as it might develop in a 
post-war and post-revolutionary developing nation such as Cambodia. Theories of 
modernisation, depending on the specific phase and locality, suggest that 
development will reduce violent crime but also increase property and other crimes 
(notably those against the state) as the rationalisation of modern governance is 
achieved. Modernisation requires a shift in economic modes of production from 
feudal/mercantilist to industrial forms or from "Asiatic" or command to market 
economies. This shift in productive forces produced in the classic formvii  greater 
individualism, a significant middle class, weakened communal regulation, changed 
the nature of relationships from hierarchical to exchange and shifted social control 
from informal to formal modes. Also because of the civilising (or socialisation) 
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effects of modernisationviii violence becomes more problematic and is subject to an 
intensified criminalisation process combined with an increasing reliance on 
bureaucratic surveillance and special policing institutions. Thus, in this functionalist 
version, modernisation in its early phases generates acquisitive crime by weakening 
social control and unleashing expectationsix. In late modernisation, violence increases 
as conflict re-emerges due to rapidly changing modes of production and the 
fragmentation of post-modern identities. 
 
Neopolitan (1997:360) combining Durkheim and Elias, argues that violence declines 
because modernisation results in “…increased social equality and organic solidarity 
and a resultant civilizing of the human personality”. Modernisation or development is 
usually measured by economic development and, following the European experience, 
the degree of urbanisation or differences between urban and rural life.  Cambodia at 
$US 270 GNP per capita is one of the least economically developed and urbanised 
countries in the region [see Table 5]. Cultural integration or homogeneity often 
associated with Durkheim’s idea of “organic solidarity” and measured by fidelity to 
religious, linguistic and customary beliefs has also been seen as influencing the 
amount of violent crime. Studies of the relationship between culture and homicide, 
using measures of religious and ethnic homogeneity, have not found evidence of a 
consistent pattern. Nor has a relationship between economic development and 
homicide been found (del Frate, 1998, Newman 1999, LaFree 1999)x.  
 
Other explanatory theories of cross-national differences in violence include 
opportunity/stress theories that highlight changes in the pool of potential offenders 
and opportunities for violence that vary according to economic and social hardships. 
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Thus the relative size of high risk groups (young unemployed males), population 
density, household size, income inequality, unemployment and infant mortality have 
all been employed with varying success as determinants of violence. Cambodia, with 
its exceptionally youthful population, acute levels of income inequality and relatively 
high under-employment can also be vulnerable to the play of these hardships and 
their presumed deleterious effects on the risks of violence. Competition over scarce 
resources in the context of desperation can also produce greater recklessness which 
may be reflected in the high levels of robbery murder observed for Cambodia (Daly 
and Wilson 1999).  
 
A concordant “civilising process” generated by modernisation reduces the incidence 
of violence as sensibilities about suffering increase and the demand for “blood” 
sacrifice decrease. Thus in modernising societies, violent crime will decrease and 
homicide rates will decline. The role of the ‘rational’ state through its security 
[monopolisation of violence], management and welfare functions is crucial in this 
civilising process. The state, by improving health services, food/livelihood security 
and literacy, and suppressing crime legitimates its governancexi. The RGC’s national 
development plan gives priority to the establishment of the institutional means to 
create a modern “rule of law” state by strengthening regulatory agencies, especially 
police and courts. This priority is supported by donor nations and the International 
Monetary Fund’s [IMF] rehabilitation program for Cambodia. 
 
Theoretically, it may be useful to consider the extent to which the processes of 
modernisation influence the nature and extent of crime emerging from extreme intra-
state conflicts. Can crime in Cambodia be characterised as pre-modern and does 
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economic development suppress or exaggerate conflicts?  Certainly higher levels of 
violence in the countryside than the city but more property crime in the city than the 
country are observed. In accord with modernisation theory differences in urban and 
rural crime suggest a relationship between the strength of the state and opportunities 
for crime concomitant with development.  Sporadic episodes of banditry, robbery and 
abduction are also reported more frequently in rural districts and these incidents 
reflect the relative weakness of the state and the limited radius of its policing 
institutions. This pre-modern picture is reinforced by the low enforcement capability 
and poor adherence to due process. The rehabilitation of legal processes after the 
almost complete destruction of the judicial corps has been in progress but is hindered 
by the absence of a tradition of rule by law and the low pay of state agents. As 
Chandler (1992) has shown these weaknesses were common in pre-revolutionary 
Cambodia and current political friction and abuses have precedents in the 1954 post-
colonial kingdom. 
 
Post-war economic stresses also generate increases in both property and personal 
crime, especially in the city where wage labour is vulnerable to shifts in trade and 
investment. Although Cambodia does not have a critical food security problem the 
bulk of the population is rice dependent. Up to half of village income was used for 
rice consumption which provided 80% of calorie intake. Rural poverty is a serious 
problem with as many as 40% or more living below the poverty line and there are 
endemic but moderate levels of malnutrition. Credit problems and indebtedness are 
widespread (Murshid 1998). Despite an abundance of land a land-less or land poor 
class has emerged and has become a source of accelerated migration to the city or 
towns.  At the same time as the gap between rich and poor increases access to 
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traditional sources of succour, the rivers and forests (common lands), have become 
more restricted by large commercial interests. Thus, the revival of plantation 
economies and indenture like work practices has contributed to further pressure on 
the land-less. Cambodia is thus an economy dependent on subsistence rice agriculture, 
exploitation of forest and international aid but with the burden of massive post-war 
reconstruction. GDP growth was slashed to below 2% in 1997-1998 from 6.5% in 
1996 due to the twin influences of the Asian financial crisis and the July 5-6 1997 
coup which cut-off investment and all but essential aid. In what was already one of 
the poorest countries in the ASEAN group the impact of these economic difficulties 
adversely impacted on efforts to contain disorder and crime. Annual inflation reached 
15% in the first half of 1998 placing considerable pressure on the poor and labouring 
classes as basic food and housing prices sharply increased while income declined. 
While GDP growth has recovered to 4.5-5.0% in 1999-2000 investment remains 
stalled and recovery further hampered by severe floods in 2000 (Cambodia 
Development Review 1998; Far Eastern Economic Review, December 14, 2000:87). 
Such crushing poverty contributed to intermittent banditry and placed already 
vulnerable groups under additional pressure. Crime victimisation is often catastrophic 
and may lead to impoverishment. 
 
The establishment of rational, rule of law government is considered a basic pre-
condition for the stable and predictable development of capital, markets and wealth 
(World Bank 1997). In developing economies, the transformation of the economy 
from feudal/subsistence forms to a post-revolutionary market economy requires a 
professional and predictable government. The reliability of law and policing 
institutions is seen as an essential factor in the development of a market economy 
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based on trade and commerce. Therefore, the effectiveness of legal institutions in 
creating stability and order is prerequisite for the establishment of legitimate 
governance in the Kingdomxii. Thus, the extent that police serve a general order and 
provide civil protection to the populace rather than serve a specific regime, may 
provide a measure of state strength. High levels of lethal violence, especially extra-
judicial violence, are indicative of the states debility. “Many human rights 
critiques…fail to recognise police shortcomings as an expression of state weakness 
rather than of its strength” [Goldsmith 2001:18]. Given the violence threatened by 
powerful non-state actors, policing institutions are vulnerable to adopting partial and 
repressive measures that ultimately undermine their legitimacyxiii. In the context of 
conflict, the formation of autonomous state policing institutions is also uncertain 
because of underlying competition between various factions to provide security.  
Different policing agencies and factions within them thus compete to monopolise the 
“…universal sinews of state power” (Skocpol 1985:16), revenues and coercive force, 
and consequently reinforce political fragility. 
 
Policing, Law and the Reformation of the Cambodian State 
 
The fragmentation of the original civil society by war and genocide has meant that a 
conscious effort is required to re-invent and reproduce the social and moral order of 
an ideal pre-war Khmer nation. The 1991 Paris Accords reconstituted, under UNTAC 
supervision, the RGC as a pluralistic state made up of the former SOC, Khmer Rouge 
and Royalists under the rubric of “Nation, Religion, King”.  This is a context in which 
the crucial struggle for the rule of law demands that the new state’s nascent legal 
institutions monopolise violence and install nationwide means to resolve disputes and 
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deal with criminals (Sok and Sarin 1998; Fernando 1998). However, an aid dependent 
RGC negotiates the means to effect state legitimisation while under the scrutiny of 
numerous non-government organisations [NGOs] notably the Cambodian Office of 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights [UNCOHCHR].  
 
The rationalisation of governance is an ongoing process, structures are in place but 
variable means exist to assert the control of state institutions and its agents 
independently of regime politics and traditional patron/client relations. Until recently, 
the state has depended on military and quasi-military forms of governance albeit 
fractured along political/patronage and provincial lines. In the crucial areas of 
policing and dispute resolution, few resources are available and Cambodia remains 
vulnerable to organised crime activityxiv. Ample anecdotal information suggests that 
Cambodia has become a haven for eco-exploitation, drug and sex trafficking xv , 
money laundering, small arms smuggling and other cross-border illegal activities. 
Cambodia has become the ideal de-regulated state and is therefore an unfettered 
market for crime as well as “market solutions to insecurity” (Goldsmith 2001:12). 
 
The transformation of the governance of state security from a military to civil form is 
an important goal of the national development plan along with improving food and 
personal security, human rights, health education and economic development. The 
shift required from a military command economy to a market economy is burdened 
by the 47% of the RGC revenue absorbed by the security forces [Ministries of Interior 
and Defence]. As little as 10% of meagre revenues went to education, 6% to health 
and 3% to agricultural development (Konrad Adenauer Foundation cited in Phnom 
Penh Post, Vol. 7, No. 17, 1998). Under the 1993 UNTAC de-mobilisation plan, 
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large numbers of former soldiers were placed in policing roles on below subsistence 
wages. Consequently, the inadequate management and discipline of such a large body 
of armed and ill trained ‘police’ has been a major problem and source of impunity.  
Progressive reductions in under-employed untrained police and military planned by 
the year 2001 require numbers of police and military personnel to fall to 67,000 from 
the current 137,000. However, reductions in security forces and weapon availability 
have been hampered by factional differences in the key Ministry of the Interior [MOI] 
and the overall civilianising process will be lengthy and involved. Nevertheless, 
extensive training of police and military in constitutional responsibilities and the 
scrutiny of a large number of human rights NGO’s support a rule of law culture. 
These efforts contributed to the satisfactory levels of security forces during the 1998 
July election supervised by the National Election Commissionxvi. 
 
The RGC operates in the context of a politically divided government of former 
antagonists - royalists, revolutionaries and socialists. Consequently state institutions 
are complex and open to factional conflicts and an effective law-making consensual 
process has not been achieved. Historically the Kingdom had a weak indigenous 
bureaucracy based on a French and Vietnamese colonial legacy in which recourse to 
state and legal institutions was relatively rare.  Traditionally the Cambodian state was 
hierarchical with the revered King, the elite government officialsxvii, the villagers of 
Kompong and Preih [forest] and the sanga or Buddhist monks all in their place in the 
complex web of patronage and power. In crucial ways these traditional, often 
unmediated hierarchical relations found there expression in the utopian self-
sufficiency program of the Revolutionary Democratic Republic Kampuchea [1975-
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79] and continue to shape Cambodian personal and social relationships (Chandler 
1992:53-54). 
 
The ceaseless cycles of rice growing that define Khmer village life impose a 
customary order insulated even from the special, if relatively brief, traumas of the 
Khmer Rouge revolutionary utopia and the first Vietnamese invasion and occupation 
of modern times. In the context of the New Kingdom, these village continuities 
provide a natural social order replete with communal surveillance and control that 
reduce the need for intervention by the state in interpersonal disputes. Accordingly, 
the role of the state in creating order is limited to the extent that it may impose 
uniformity on these politically fragmented pre-existing social identities and 
relationships in rural Cambodia. A task that has perhaps never previously been 
achieved by any Khmer state with the possible exception of the Angorian period. 
 
The sanga, along with intellectuals, were the targets of special oppression by the 
Khmer Rouge because as carriers of traditional morality they were a source of 
resistance to the new order (Keirnan 1996). Buddhism was also denigrated as inimical 
to communist values during the Vietnamese occupation but, along with the King, it is 
promoted as a foundation of the new nation. The moral vacuum created by the 
dissolution of the post-colonial state and the failure of revolutionary idealism enabled 
the rapid return of this traditionally important institution.  The sanga have revived 
their tenure and everywhere Pagodas have been re-built in this devout Buddhist 
society.   The sanga and the kharmic laws have a protective, if poorly understood, role 
in shaping and moderating violence and crime. The re-establishment of Buddhism has 
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been significant in the regeneration of indigenous moral order but its revival is 
challenged by modernity, materialism and new forms of crime.   
 
The arch-criticism of Buddhism has been that it produced fatalism, conservatism and 
carelessness towards death (an opportunity for re-birth and enlightenment) as a by-
product. These artefacts of Buddhism are often assumed to lead to a diminution in the 
sanctity of life in Buddhist societies in much the same way that Catholicism is 
supposed to liberate the passions through forgiveness and the confessional. However, 
this neglects the emphasis on compassion and enlightenment in Buddhism which 
heightens the importance of the reciprocal nature of patron-client relationships so 
characteristic of Cambodian political and social lifexviii. The Buddhist ethical system 
through stress on the four noble truths (which emphasise enlightenment, compassion 
and prohibit killing, stealing, lying and adultery), the middle way and the eight-fold 
path socialises a cooperative and docile human nature.  The emphasis on avoidance of 
suffering and the accumulation of merit provides a potent traditional source of natural 
or internalised forms of social control against violence. Thus, a recognisable basis for 
the establishment of clearly defined laws is embedded into the culture. However, law 
making has been restrained by political instability and administrative fragmentation 
that reflects the continued importance of the Strok or district in national affairs. The 
ensuing hiatus allowed for ample regional and political differences in the creation and 
application of national law.  
 
Although a new penal code is being drafted, current laws are based on the1992 
UNTAC criminal code. This interim code failed to provide a comprehensive ethical 
system or secure due process consistent with Khmer values further eroding the 
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legitimacy of law. UN sponsored efforts to rapidly develop a modern court and 
dispute settlement process included a “Judicial Mentor Program” that relied on 
guidance by overseas judges. This attempt to provide training for court officials [most 
former SOC judges] faltered because the poorly paid judges were prone to corruption 
or intimidation and access to courts was prohibitively expensive to all but the elite. It 
is known that a substantial number of offences and disputes are resolved without the 
involvement of provincial or national courts. Therefore, some serious crime and much 
petty crime and disorder, as everywhere, will be under-reportedxix.  
 
In the following, reported crime, especially lethal violence is described from available 
sources.  The principal source of data is a report for the period 1992-1996 prepared by 
the Judicial Police Centre, MOI in July 1998 and subsequent summary annual reports. 
This source provides limited trend data covering the arrival of UNTAC and the 
establishment of the RGC to the end of 1999. In addition reports of NGO’s, Khmer 
newspapers, as well as interviews, case notes and field studies supplement official 
sourcesxx. The focus shifts to the integrity of investigations into homicide and other 
serious crime and their relevance to the legitimisation process in the new state. 
 
Recorded Crime  
 
Law enforcement in Cambodia involves a number of different policing agencies 
including military police and it is unlikely crime records compiled by the Judicial 
Police Centre are complete. Because of uncertain counting and variable reporting 
behaviour, the most reliable approach to the interpretation of trends for most crimes 
in Table 2 is that they reflect the activities of police rather than “real” fluctuations in 
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crime. Nevertheless for homicide we have several sources and may be more confident 
of the recording of these events. 
 
Overall, the reported crime rate for all offences is very low in Cambodia with a mere 
5638 offences recorded in 1996 or a rate of 59.6 per 100,000 population. This can be 
compared to the1253 offences per 100,000 recorded in Hong Kong, and the 110 per 
100,000 recorded for the Philippines (see Table 6). The MOI report also attempts to 
take into account the effectiveness of policing by recording the number of offences 
“suppressed” [cleared or “solved”] and the number of offenders held in custody. 
Recent data is not available but for 1992-1996 between 28% - 36% of crimes reported 
by the MOI were suppressed. The number of new offenders imprisoned also 
fluctuated accordingly from 1045 and 2170. However, prison census data for 1995-
1997 show the numbers held in prison increased from 2490 to 2909. These figures 
yield an estimated imprisonment rate of 26-29 per 100,000 and are comparable to 
rates reported for the Philippines but considerably lower than the 200 prisoners per 
100,000 in Hong Kongxxi. 
 
Insert Table 1 
 
Although the conventional definition of homicide as murder and non-negligent 
manslaughter is adopted the sources necessitate ambiguity in defining homicide 
because of the unclear status of justifiable homicides and other forms of non-
negligent manslaughter recorded by National Judicial Police. The actual number of 
murder victims was not reported and must be estimated from previous years, deaths 
recorded under "losses" by the MOI, field studies and newspaper reports. A detailed 
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estimate of the homicide rate is provided below and only a rate for murder events can 
be utilised to compare risks of lethal violence between the city and countryside. 
During 1996, 542 murder events were recorded at a rate of 5.7 per 100,000xxii but the 
rate varied substantially by province. For the city of Phnom Penh it was 4.7 events per 
100,000, 6.4 for the densely populated central province of Kompong Cham and in 
Seim Reap province, site of the famous Angor temples it was13.8 per 100,000xxiii.  
 
Urban and Rural Crime  
 
Phnom Penh is the only large city in Cambodia and a major entrepot port attracting a 
substantial proportion of the country’s markets, economic growth and investment. 
The city has grown rapidly as investors (mostly North Asian and ASEAN based) 
were attracted by low costs in the wake of the 1989 market reforms that ended the 
Soviet style command economy. The industrial sector has provided, until recently, the 
most growth in the economy and much of this occurred in and around the city. The 
city is a natural draw for the land-less poor who provide labour for large garment, 
service and light manufactures.  Through 1997-1998, there was a sharp decline in 
investment and growth and a return to high inflation. These conditions severely 
affected the livelihood of the wage classes and no doubt increased conflicts and risk-
taking.  
 
Insert Table 2 
 
The pattern of recorded crime shown in Table 2 differs strikingly from that found in 
most advanced jurisdictions. Property crime and theft account for only 36.8% of 
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recorded crime while offences against the person make up the remainder. The usual 
ratio of violent to property crime is 1 in 10 or less. In Australia and Hong Kong 
violence against the person accounts for less than 10% of all recorded crime. Thus, 
non-lethal crime, especially property crime, is either vastly under-reported or 
relatively rare in the villages and communes of the Kingdom. Because of the 
situational determinants of theft risk in villages it is likely that property crime is low 
in rural areas but this will also be magnified by poor communications with national 
police. Property crime was more frequent in the city and violent crime, except armed 
robbery, occurred more frequently in rural areas as would be predicted by a pre-
modern version of the developing state. 
 
In 1996, Phnom Penh recorded nearly a quarter [23.7%] of all recorded crime in 
Cambodia at over two and half times the rate, at 156.1 per 100,000, of the whole 
country. Nearly a third  (31.6%) of the recorded property theft, 36.6% of the armed 
robberies and 22% of the pick-pocket, and fraud offences occurred in a city that 
comprises only 7.6% of the total population. However, only 7.2% of the recorded 
homicides and 3.5% of assaults occurred in the city suggesting that violence is better 
regulated but relative wealth and anonymity create opportunities for theft. 
 
Although independent sources are limited, the data suggests that crime declined in the 
immediate post-war. However, the withdrawal of UNTAC civil police and 
investigative support reduced the capability of the RGC police and this presumably 
impacted on reporting practicexxiv. Even if crime fell in the 2 years after the1993 UN 
supervised election and the creation of the RGC this decline was quickly reversed. 
The uneven impact of re-construction, demobilisation, and economic development 
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delivered scant relief to the most vulnerable and displaced. Added to these difficulties 
was increasing tension within the political coalition which culminated in the coup 
d'état of July 1997. For a few days Phnom Penh was turned into a battlefield and the 
Second Prime Minister Hun Sen of the Cambodian People’s Party ousted First Prime 
Minister Prince Ranridth leader of the royalist Funcinpec Partyxxv. Equally, adverse 
economic conditions, especially the financial crisis engendered by the July 1997 coup, 
were severely aggravated by the collapse of the Thai economy and the October 1997 
Asian financial crisis. These events were followed by intense and frequently violent 
pre and post 1998 election tension. Such multiple pressures would predict an increase 
in crime in 1998. It is possible that both decreased police efficiency and post-war 
fatigue temporarily drove down recorded crime while extreme economic adversity 
from mid-1997 increased conflicts and stress and drove crime up. We have little 
means to formally test such explanations and only tentative conclusions can be drawn. 
Police data for 1998 show a relatively sharp increase from 1996 in all recorded crime 
including murder and armed robbery, although abating in 1999. The very low 1997 
figures are discounted because of the acute disruption to policing and recording in the 
wake of the coup.   
 
The Prevalence of Lethal Violence 
 
The official crime statistics are likely to significantly under-estimate the rate of 
homicide and other crime. The figures supplied by the MOI are not audited, nor are 
counting protocols clearly defined.  Problematic assumptions are made about the 
completeness of police data and the uniformity of recording practice throughout 
Cambodia.  It is also assumed that the definition of murder and homicide is 
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comparable to that elsewhere and distinctions between murder and other forms of 
(potentially) criminal death in the MOI sources are retained. Because precise 
situational and personal details are required to determine if a killing constitutes 
murder, it is assumed that recording practices reflect these important distinctions in a 
cultural meaningful way. Thus, given these caveats and adjustments for known 
sources of error an estimate of the prevalence of homicide may be made.  
 
The first source of error is that reported murders record the number of events and not 
the number of victims. Thus, multiple victim events are recorded as a single incident. 
To estimate the number of homicide victims we must refer to Khmer newspapers and 
official references to “losses”. Second, it is unlikely that all homicides are recorded 
and the sources do not report accidental death, suicide or separately describe the usual 
homicide categories of attempted murder, infanticide and manslaughter xxvi . Apart 
from the 542 murders for 1996, other forms of homicide are recorded. Noted are 19 
“intentional killings”, 54 grenade attacks that led to 201 injuries or deaths, 108 
offenders shot dead and 36 injured. In addition, a further 53 presumably non-fatal 
poisonings and 44 kidnaps were recorded (Judicial Police Centre, July 1998). 
Notionally the deaths may be classified as homicides although, based on cases, a 
proportion of the grenade events are accidental and deaths arising from police action 
may be justified. Third, the remote provinces of Kratie, Kompong Speu and 
Mondulkiri, with a combined population of approximately 836,000, returned no 
reports of criminal offences for 1996 to National Judicial Police and accordingly rates 
are adjusted.  
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Finally, it is unclear but likely that the deaths of suspects due to police/military or 
mob/militia actions are excluded from the murder count. Deaths allegedly motivated 
by political conflict reported by the UNCOHCHR are usually included. Other acts of 
intimidation, harassment and non-lethal violence of a political nature may not be 
recorded in official sources and thus may be in addition to the crime ratexxvii. Judicial 
Police records for 1997 are incomplete and exclude the estimated 50 plus battlefield 
deaths arising from the July coup conflicts. Many of the approximately 100 post-coup 
and national elections “political” deaths reported by UNCOHCHR are recorded in 
1998 by MOI. A considerable degree of harassment and intimidation related to post-
coup conflict and the 1998 election was noted but relatively few of the confirmed 
“killings” reported by the UNCOHCHR arose from exclusively political conflictsxxviii. 
Politics may also serve to mask motives that are more mundane and often political 
and personal rivalries are intertwined. However, the circumstances produce special 
modes of violence including extreme but diminishing political violence. Raiding 
activities of the remnants of the Khmer Rouge and other soldier-bandits, for example, 
cannot be characterised as political or battlefield actions because coherent ideological 
and command structures no longer motivate these acts of violence. 
 
Until a credible system of death registration and investigation based on international 
standardsxxix is established the data on murder and homicide will remain uncertain 
and the subject of continual controversy.  The problem is aggravated by low 
investigative and forensic scientific capability. The main criminal investigative 
department has few trained police, no laboratory/mortuary or forensic pathologist and 
insufficient resources to staff all provinces. Thus available data is not comprehensive 
and estimates are conservative.  
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 Details on the type or motive of murders and age and sex of victims and offenders are 
not available from MOI sources. However, analysis of newspapers suggests robbery 
murder, revenge, quarrels and disputes are the most common reasons for murder. 
Khmer press coverage is extremely pictorial and has a significant influence on the 
perception of the risks of homicide. Approximately 61% of victims died because of 
gunfire, a further 14.6% from knifes and other sharp instruments and 12.5% from 
unknown causes. Most homicide victims, reported by the press, are males usually 
shot by offenders armed with military weapons. Women make up 11.6% of victims 
and those 21-29 years old were the most frequently cited age group. Suicides, 
accidental deaths and traffic accidents are also frequently noted suggesting substantial 
levels of these forms of mortality. Although newspaper reports of homicide are 
incomplete and an unreliable means of measuring crime, they provide a ratio of 
deaths to homicide events.  
 
Insert Table 3 
 
Table 3 describes the victims and fatalities identified in Khmer newspapers from 
January to early July 1998. This shows that 26.7% of the 240 reported deaths 
involved the death of a suspect or offender at the hands of the police, local “mobs” or 
militia. One hundred or 41.7% were prima facie murder or manslaughter victims 
sometimes killed in multiple-victim episodes involving multiple offenders. About 
24.2% of the deaths recorded were accidental of which the majority was traffic 
related and 7.5% were successful suicides. Most of the victims of the category 
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“attempted murder” were survivors of an armed robbery. The164 notional homicides 
arose from 130 incidents averaging 1.26 deaths per event. 
 
Insert Table 4 
 
The 1998 MOI report also refers to the number of deaths, injuries, and property losses 
recorded for 1992-1995. From this source, the total number of deaths recorded by 
national police was 1,222 or 12.86 per 100,000 in 1993.  These deaths arose from 599 
murders and 157 grenade attacks which resulted in 1,008 deaths at an average of 1.34 
fatalities per event, and 214 “offenders” reported shot dead during police action. 
Using this ratio of 1:1.34 deaths to events and the ratio derived from the Khmer press 
[1:1.26] we can estimate the approximate number of victims for 1996 by applying the 
average ratio [1:1.3]. This weighting produced 775 homicide deaths from the 596 
recorded events; in addition, the 108 offenders killed by police yields a total of 883 
deaths at a rate of 9.32 per 100,000. Table 5 shows the 1992-1998 homicide rates 
including [rate B] or excluding [rate A] suspect deaths and conservatively represents 
the estimated range for the prevalence of homicide. 
 
As noted, about one in five newspaper crime reports refer to police or mob killings of 
suspects.  These forms of extra-judicial homicide make up over a quarter of all the 
deaths and nearly two fifths of all homicides reported by the press. Table 5 indicates 
that the proportion of extra-judicial deaths of all homicides has varied from 17.5% in 
1993, 9.0% in 1994, 5.8% in 1995, 12.2% in 1996 and 10.2% in 1998.  The 
proportion of “offender” deaths in Table 5 for 1998 are much lower than estimated 
from news reports. This appears to be a function of news selection and the possible 
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failure of police to diligently record deaths arising from vigilante action. 
Consequently, such a measure serves only as a crude and conservative indicator of 
fidelity to rule by law. The high number of extra-judicial homicides is attributed to 
the armed nature of most offending, a weak rule of law culture and the poor discipline 
and training of police. The risk of spontaneous acts of violence and mayhem are also 
relatively high given the number of grenade incidents and accidents reported in the 
press and official sources. However, these behaviours do not appear to equate with 
notions of “amok” although often ill directed and non-utilitarian (Winzeler 1990). 
 
The Comparative Prevalence of Homicide 
 
Returning to our opening question about the relative level of lethal violence in 
Cambodia compared with other countries an attempt, through comparative analysis, is 
made in Table 5 to address the question of the severity of violence of Cambodia. In a 
comparative approach, we hope to identify cultural, economic, political, situational 
and social factors that explain macro-differences in homicide. The aim is to 
understand the variables that appear to weaken or strengthen the risks of crime at the 
broadest level.  Comparative studies enable key aspects of culture, especially the 
definition and social reaction to crime, to be observed and also help identify factors 
that shape the prevalence and nature of crime (Arthur and Marenin 1995).  
 
Insert Table 5 
 
There are many macro-level factors thought to influence cross-national differences in 
crime including amongst others religious and cultural diversity, relative economic 
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strength, and the effectiveness of state governance. The concept of modernisation 
conventionally proposes that the essential relationship between crime and 
development is that modernity reduces violencexxx. Table 5 locates the homicide rates 
and socio-economic conditions for Cambodia in comparison with other countriesxxxi. 
Factors indicative of socio-economic development and modernity included: person 
per telephone [PPT] and person per television [PPTV] as measures of modern culture; 
average life expectancy in years [life expect.] as measures of mortality and stress; the 
percent of the total population living in urban areas [% urban] and the percent of the 
total population who can read and write [% literate] as measures of modernity; and 
gross net product per person [GNP $US] as measures of socio-economic strengthxxxii. 
Analysis of the relationship between these factors and homicide using rank 
correlation methods proved inconsistent and no single or derived factor accounted for 
more than 12% of the variation observed. Thus, few of the socio-economic factors 
listed in Table 5 appear to relate to the homicide rate although increased wealth 
appears to have some protective value. Measures of state strength or capacities and 
autonomy provide better correlations with stronger states associated with lower levels 
of homicide. Differences in criminal justice policy and practice may be more crucial 
with high homicide nations such as Cambodia, Philippines, Thailand enduring 
relatively unfettered firearms, low enforcement capability and regime influenced 
policing institutions. Cambodia had a rate of homicide similar to other Buddhist states 
Thailand and Mongolia, but less than Sri Lanka did in 1996. The latter nation was 
disrupted by chronic civil war and Mongolia was a newly independent state. Amongst 
the developed nations, only Taiwan and the USA approached the level of 
Cambodiaxxxiii. Regardless of which measure was utilised the homicide rate for the 
Philippines is informative and is further examined. 
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 Crime and lethal violence in Cambodia are now compared briefly with Hong Kong 
and the Philippines. These states have useful contrasting colonial histories, socio-
religious values and, economic development that may help disentangle the 
relationship between modernity, extreme conflicts and crime. The emerging economy 
of the Philippines with its Spanish-American colonial legacy and dominant Catholic 
values can be contrasted with the Taoist and Confucian values of the former British 
colony of Hong Kong now an advanced market and service economy. 
 
Insert Table 6  
 
Table 6 compares select crimes recorded in Cambodia with the reported levels in the 
Philippines and their respective cities. Rates for the city state of Hong Kong are 
included to provide the contrast of a highly developed Asian economy with generally 
well respected, financed and able policing institutions (see Broadhurst 2001).  
Because crime statistics in the Philippines are incident or event based the 
comparisons are only approximatexxxiv . The Philippine homicide rate was perhaps 
twice that of Cambodia and the overall rates of recorded crime nearly double that of 
the Kingdom. Although heightened by episodic insurgency, especially in the 
religiously divided southern islands, the homicide rate may be driven more by 
modernity induced relative deprivation than is the case of the more isolated and 
insulated communes of Cambodia. The incidence of murder was similar in Phnom 
Penh and Manila and both experienced lower risks than the countryside but Manila 
had a higher incidence of homicide.  Incidents of assault and rape were more frequent 
in Manila than Phnom Penh but armed robbery was lower than in Phnom Penh. Apart 
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from homicide, the cities were generally more at risk of crime than the countryside 
and attracted higher rates of armed robbery and theft.  Since 1994 incidences of 
homicide have fallen substantially in Manila and were estimated to be 2.6 in 2000 
compared to 17.0 per 100,000 in 1994.  Murder and homicide have remained high in 
rural areas and the overall national “volume” was 14.0 per 100,000 but significant 
declines indicate some success in the struggle to create effective general order 
policing in the Republic. 
 
For Hong Kong rates of violent crime are much lower than in either Cambodia or the 
Philippines with the exception of injurious assaults. This may reflect situational 
advantages, especially medical assistance, and lack of access to lethal weapons, both 
significant determinants of mortality. The rate for property crime was considerably 
higher as was overall crime. A wealth of opportunity for theft, extensive personal 
insurance and a sophisticated modern police presumably account for this striking 
differencexxxv. 
 
Tentative Conclusions  
 
This paper has attempted to estimate the prevalence of homicide, and describe the 
nature of violence from the limited sources available. Cambodia was found to have a 
high level of homicide fluctuating between 4.8 and 12.9 per 100,000 population.  
Much of the volatility in the homicide rate appears to reflect the varying stability of 
the state and acute episodic disruptions to economic growth. The nature of homicide 
in Cambodia differs from that of developed countries and features significant levels 
of extra-judicial homicide, banditry and mayhem that contributed to its lawless 
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reputation. These forms of homicide are indicative of weak formal social control. 
Khmer are subject to the same emotions and desires as everyone and thus homicide 
reflects the full range of categories albeit enhanced by ready access to highly lethal 
means. The majority of homicides are armed robberies suggesting that conflicts over 
scarce resources (strain) and values permissive of violence (via the mechanism of war 
legitimation) are compelling factors in the elevated rate of homicide. Nevertheless, 
we know too little about the epidemiology to be confident about links between social 
structure and cultural norms. Given the appalling trauma of the recent past, enduring 
political conflicts, the sheer scale of economic adversity and the rapidity of 
urbanisation and social changes induced by market development, the current level of 
homicide is consistent with expectations. More developed neighbours also appear to 
experience similar levels of homicide but do not share the degree of social 
desperation or deficits in human assets. Indeed a rate somewhat lower than would be 
predicted by an integrated strain and cultural theory of violence may be indicated. 
Communal traditions, localism and pro-social values have prevailed as potent forms 
of collective protection and could be reinforced by effective governance, but these are 
fragile shields threatened by the tendency of modernity to privilege individuality and 
materialism.  
 
Supported by international assistance the RGC has attempted to develop a rule of law 
state through reforms of the policing institutions but shortages of human and social 
capital compel the transitional process to be fraught with difficulty. The incessant 
need for dispute settlement and crime control consequently tends to operate to 
mobilise under-paid policing institutions according to market forces and not abstract 
notions of the rule of law.  The low salaries, poor training and equipment provided 
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police and judicial officers induces bribery and corruption and provides the thread of 
impunity that enables predatory corruption to thrive and challenge or even capture 
key elements of the state.  The establishment of effective policing institutions and 
their role in state legitimation is crucial to the provision of order and predicability as 
the means of furthering rational economic development and modernisation.  The 
current situation, therefore, is not simply a product of lawless behaviour but the 
absence of law reflective of indigenous morality and legitimate institutions to enforce 
them. In practice the lawlessness reflected in extra-judicial homicide is a product of 
under-policing and the perceived lack of legitimacy of judicial processes which has 
left communal or customary dispute resolution intact. Summary killings by mobs and 
police may often reflect communal solidarity and achieved justice as much as the 
entrenched after-effects of wartime legitimation of violence. Many of these 
incidences are clear and deplorable breaches of the human rights of suspects but in 
circumstances where crime victimisation can be devastating to livelihoods citizens’ 
actions can also reflect the need to act swiftly and sternly against predators. Police 
respond either sympathetically or impotently, thus further weakening rule by due 
process of law.  It is, however, naïve to imagine that appeals to “normative” legal 
values will be effective in compelling weak policing institutions and fearful citizens 
to act otherwise. 
 
The above suggests some of the causes that generate high risks of personal violence 
in Cambodia and the complex role the state and modernisation may play in 
transforming the nature of homicide and crime. A lack of temporal data and detailed 
epidemiology of violence allows only speculation about the role development and 
policing play in the production of homicide and crime. The data indicate an increase 
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in property crime, sustained as the forces of economic transformation change the 
nature of criminal opportunities and competition for scarce resources. Thus while 
political stability may lead to a decrease in group-conflicts and war-legitimated lethal 
violence such events account for a declining fraction of homicide in Cambodia.  
Reduction in such violence alone is unlikely to lead to a rapid decline in the homicide 
rate because inter-personal conflicts arise from a multiplicity of sources that 
ultimately draw from the deep reservoirs of emotion and need. The cultural and 
structural determinants of violence and the capacities and autonomy of states to 
modify violence are highlighted by the extreme case of Cambodia. Comparative 
research may provide the contrast required in identifying the most salient conditions, 
weighing the role of the state and policing institutions. Continued close monitoring of 
homicide and violence based on sound reporting and investigative systems is one 
process by which a reflective state may seek to restore the sanctity of life and de-
legitimate the use of violence. Combined with a determined disarmament program 
and a commitment to ensuring legitimate independent law enforcement agencies such 
an approach should also contribute to a reduction or stabilisation of homicide and 
other violent crime despite the economic difficulties to be endured. We can conclude 
with the hope that as policing institutions become professional and rule by law is 
established, a decline in extra-judicial forms of homicide will occur. Even so unless 
there is an indigenous moral order reflected in law, and relief from desperation 
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 Table 1: Crime Trends Recorded by Judicial Police 1992-1999 
 
   1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Murder  429 599 303 397 542 317 793 581 
Armed Robbery 1414 1613 905 832  1345 887 1822 1396 
Grenade  40 157 79 27 54 46 68 42 
Rape   106 43 39 84 122 46 130 165 
Kidnap a  9 93 133 24 44 23 130 91 
Poisons a  14 47 42 23 24 21 0 20 
Patrimonyb  8 6 20  12 6 n/a n/a n/a 
Theft   1420 792 835 896 1471 868 1871 1789 
Assault/Disputesc 515 267 353 423 1050 445 1114 1058  
Fraud/pick-pocketd 23 117 163 214 233 97 244 248 
Illegal Weapon 136 514 235 310 79 n/a n/a n/a 
Other  Offences n/a n/a 20 n/a 668 208 950 641 
All Crime  4114  4248 3031  3260 5638e 2958 7122 6031 
Rate   45.2 44.7 30.9 32.6 59.6 27.9 65.8 53.8 
 
Sources 1992-1996 and 1997-1999 annual returns MOI Judicial Police Centre; data 
for 1997 incomplete. Notes: n/a = not available; (a) poisoning and kidnapping are 
presumed non-fatal; (b) comprises theft of cultural heritage; (c) records only injurious 
assaults; (d) offences combined in original source; and (e) total includes 201 injuries 
associated with grenade attacks. 
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Table 2: Type of Crime as a Proportion of All Recorded Crime 1996 
 
Criminal Offences   Cambodia  Phnom Penh 
     %   % 
Murder    10.3    3.0 
Rape and Molestation    2.5    0.1 
Assault   19.4    2.9 
Armed Injuries   3.7    6.3 
Other Against Persona    3.4     2.8 
Armed Robbery   23.8   38.3 
Stealing    26.3   35.9 
Other Theftb    7.4     4.2 
Otherc      3.1     4.0 




Source: MOI Judicial Police Centre (1998). Notes: (a) grenade attacks, 
kidnap/abduction and, threats; (b) other offences against the state, cultural thefts, 
breaches of trust, pick-pocketing and fraud; (c) damage property, illegal weapons, 
drug and immigration offences. 
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Table 3: Serious Crime & Fatalities Reported by Khmer Press January 1-July 7, 1998 
 
Type of Event     n   % 
 
Police Action     48   15.4 
Vigilante Action    16   5.1 
Murder/Manslaughter    100   32.0 
Attempted Murder*    46   14.7 
Suicide     18   5.8   
Attempted suicide*    2   0.6 
Kidnap/Robbery*    20   6.4 
Rape*      4   1.2 
Road fatality     30   9.6 
Misadventures     28   9.0 
 
All victims     312   100.00 
 
 
Source: Phnom Penh Post Vol. 7 (1-15) from crimes reported in Khmer newspapers 





Table 4: Estimates of the Prevalence of Homicide 1992-98 
 
    1992 1993 1994 1995 1996a 1998 
 
Murder events   429 599 303 397 542 793 
rate    4.71 6.3 3.09 3.97 5.70 7.33 
 
Grenade events   40 157 79 27 54 68 
rate    0.44 1.65 0.81 0.27 0.57 0.63 
 
Estimated victims  487 1008 427 551* 775* 1119*  
rate A    5.35 10.60 4.35 5.50 8.18 10.34 
 
“Offender” deaths  n/a 214 42 34 108 139b
rate    -- 2.25 0.43 0.34 1.14 1.28 
 
All deaths   487 1222 469 585* 883* 1258* 
rate B    5.35 12.86 4.78 5.84 9.32 11.62 
 
Source: RGC MOI Reports of Judicial Police Centre 1998,1999 and 2000. Notes: (a) 
rates adjusted for missing provincial data; (b) estimated number of offender fatalities 
from newspaper and other sources; (n/a) data not available; (*) multiplier of 1.3 
fatalities per event; estimates for 1997 not attempted and; offender fatalities 
unavailable for 1992. 
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Table 5: Homicide Rates in Asian and Selected Countries 
 
Country      Homicide  GNP Religiona Life  % % PPT PPTV 
  rate per capita  expect. urban literate 
        
Nepal  2.3 225 Buddhism 55 14 28 174 355 
Cambodia*  9.3 270 Buddhism 53 21 38 1212 119.5 
Bangladesh 2.0 283 Islam  57 18 32 380 143 
Mongolia 9.6 335 Buddhism 64 61 95 26.7 17.3 
India  4.6 387 Hindu  61 27 52 65.3 16.6 
China   1.3 738 Secular 71 30 82 22.4 4.1 
Sri Lanka 11.1 760 Buddhism 72 22 89 65.1 15.2 
Myanmar 1.4 765 Buddhism 59 26 82 265 22 
Indonesia  0.9 998 Islam  63 34 84 47.7 6.8  
PNG  2.9 1005 Christian 57 17 72 4.9 11.2 
Philippinesb 33.5 1203 Catholic 67 46 94 38.6 7.9 
Thailand 9.6 2450 Buddhism 69 36 94 13.5 4.4 
Fiji  5.9 2500 Christian 72 40 90 8.9 11.1 
Malaysia 2.1 4287 Islam  72 47 89 5.5 4.7 
South Korea  1.4 9511 Buddhism 72 81 97 2.1 3.4  
Taiwan* 8.1 13303 Polytheism 75 58 93 2.1 3.1 
N. Zealand 1.8 16970 Christian 77 86 100 1.4 2.0 
Macau* 3.6 17475  Polytheism 73 75 94 2.5 3.6 
Canada* 2.7 19740 Christian  78 78 99 1.3 1.5 
Australia 1.9 20020  Christian 78 86 100 1.5 2.1 
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UK*  1.4 22268 Christian 76 90 100 1.9 2.2 
FRG*  1.5 25720 Christian  76 87 100 1.8 1.8 
Hong Kong 1.6 26400  Polytheism 79 95 92 1.5 3.0 
USA*  9.1 29950 Christian 77 76 96 1.3 1.2 
Singapore 1.8 31900 Polytheism 77 100 92 2.0 2.6 
Japan*  1.0 33800  Shinto  80 78 100 1.5 1.6 
 
 
Sources: The average per capita INTERPOL homicide rates between 1988-1994 cited 
in Neopolitan (1997) unless otherwise indicated. Notes: (*) national rates for a single 
year [1995/1996] cited from national sources; PPT = persons per telephone and, 
PPTV = persons per television; (a) principal or state religion; (b) reported by 
Philippines National Statistic Office as 18.0 incidents in 1994 for murder and other 
homicide incidents.  
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 Table 6: Selected Crime Rates 1996: Cambodia, Philippines and Hong Kong  
 
     Cambodia Philippinesa Manilaa  Phnom Penh Hong Kongb 
Murder  5.7c   9.0    5.0    4.7c      1.2 
Homicide  9.3d  16.2e  12.0e  n/a      1.6 
Robbery 12.5  9.0  25.0  59.8      1.3  
Theft  17.7  12.0  28.0  62.6  680.0 
Assaultsf 12.1  19.0  21.0  14.4    27.3 
Rape    1.1    4.0    4.0    0.1     1.4 
All Crime 60.0  110.0  180.0  156.0  1252.0 
 
 
Sources: RGC MOI Judicial Police Centre 1998; 1999 Philippines Yearbook and; 
1996 Annual Report of the Hong Kong Police. Notes: (a) all rates cited for the 
Phillipines and Manila are event or incident based; (b) all rates for Hong Kong are 
victim based; (c) murder rates for Cambodia and Phnom Penh are event/incident 
based; (d) the homicide rate for Cambodia is victim based; (e) murder and other 
homicide combined; (f) assaults causing injuries only;  n/a = not available. All rates 





                                                 
i Diplomatic advice to expatriates and travellers provided a concise warning of the 
risks of crime and political disturbances. The risks were judged as requiring "...a high 
degree of security awareness at all times", while "…widespread banditry in the 
countryside and ill-disciplined security forces constitute an ongoing security hazard" 
[Australian Embassy "Consular Travel Advice: Cambodia”, May 20, 1998]. Foreign 
nationals are at low risk of homicide but some risk of armed robbery, especially in 
Phnom Penh.  Travel at night was considered dangerous and a natural curfew 
operated. Throughout 1999 and 2000 the general security situation improved and a 
decline in lethal violence in Phnom Penh but not in the countryside has been observed. 
Travel at night remains a high-risk activity especially in some locations although the 
self-imposed curfews of the past have now eased in Phnom Penh. 
ii The accounts are reported by the Phnom Penh Post 1998 Volume 7, and extracted 
from Khmer newspapers Koh Santeheap and Rasmey Kampuchea by Bou Saroeun 
and Pok Sokundara. 
iii Market reform and liberalisation was instigated in 1989 by the former State of 
Cambodia (SOC). 
ivA process mirrored in the mid-nineteenth century restoration of the monarchy after 
decades of Vietnamese occupation and hegemony. Chandler (1992) argues the 1975-
79 Khmer Rouge induced Armageddon had parallels in the 1840s replete with foreign 
rivalries albeit less intensive than the cold war conflicts that propelled modern 
Cambodia to its present state. In the new constitution “…the King shall reign but not 
rule”. 
v The few records available do not permit trend analysis but suggest homicide rates 
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were seldom more than 2 per 100,000. Throughout the colonial protectorate period, 
only one French Civil Servant was murdered while collecting taxes but in 
circumstances of extreme provocation. Caution needs to be applied in acceptance of 
the colonial picture of low crime. French policing practices were typically indirect 
and in the early post-colonial period policing became increasingly de-centralised and 
fragmented. 
vi  Shifts between homicide and suicide patterns and changes in the relationship 
between familial and non-familial homicides are sometimes observed in post-war 
societies.  For example, in Hong Kong the immediate post war period saw declines in 
homicide but a rapid increase in suicide that stabilised at a significantly high rate as 
the economy developed (Broadhurst 1998). The decline in homicide also coincided 
with increases in the risks of intra-familial homicide suggesting that the process of 
development and modernisation weakened traditional bonds of filial piety based on 
the importance of family and clan in Taoism and Confucianism.  Modernisation’s 
tendency to strengthen individuality and heighten sensibilities towards violence 
combined with a weakening of communalism and informal social controls increase 
the relative incidence of suicide compared to homicide. The prevalence of suicide is 
unknown for Cambodia but based on anecdotal, newspaper and hospital reports it 
appears far less common than homicide. 
vii Durkheim argued the shift from mechanical (traditional) to organic (modern) forms 
of society produced more individual differences and deviance because of increasing 
specialisation and atomisation (anomie). This process weakened traditional social 
control and required increasing investment by the state in formal means of 
surveillance and social control.  
viii In Europe violence declined with the advent of mass education, health, and literacy 
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but declines in communalism and the rise of individualism tended to transform 
violence to more intimate relationships or suicide [see Gillis 1994]. 
ix The gross re-structuring of economic relations in the transformation of the pre-
modern state also generates significant conflicts because of the restructuring of labour 
and modes of production. Displaced workers may be brutalised and prey on the 
vulnerable while the land-less and land poor face competition from commercial agro-
capital and their enclosure like practices. 
x Neopolitan found that Islamic countries had lower homicide rates and the proportion 
of Christians (in non-Christian nations) indicative of higher homicide rates. He did 
not interpret these as differences arising from the religions per se but rather the 
former reflected cultural integration and traditional values while the latter was 
associated with the role of colonisation and the resultant cultural conflict. 
xi Following Elias (1939), see also Johnston and Monakkonen (1996). 
xii In the constitutional framework adopted by the Paris Accords RGC governance and 
succession is regulated by free and fair elections. 
xiii  The November 2000 raid on Phnom Pehn by the exile backed self-styled 
Cambodian Freedom Fighters is an example of the persistence of these threats. The 
poorly conceived attack was designed to undermine confidence in the protective role 
of the state and calculated to compel repressive counter-measures. 
xiv  Based on National and Judicial police arrest statistics clearance rates are 
particularly low for murder, assault and rape but higher in respect to robbery and theft. 
A 1998 MOI (Judicial Police Centre) report stressed increasing encounters with well 
organized criminal syndicates often enjoying immunity from law enforcement and 
interdiction. The Phnom Penh Post has frequently alleged that elements of the   RGC 
military and police have been implicated in organized crime and racketeering. The 
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pay of many officials is insufficient to meet everyday needs and many, if not most, 
are forced to seek employment or funds by exploiting their official status.  
xv The Cambodian Women’s Crisis Centre  [CWCC] has estimated that between 50-
55,000 prostitutes are active with 14,000 thought to be under-age. Conditions in 
illegal brothels are often akin to slavery but the extreme poverty of many families 
suggests that irresistible “push-pull” factors compel the sacrifice of daughters 
regardless of conditions (personal communication Ms. Michele Brandt CWCC). 
xvi UNCOHCHR and the Cambodian Institute of Human Rights [CIHR] undertook 
training programs on the constitution for senior officers of the Royal Army of 
Cambodia, National Police, Gendarmerie [Military Police] and MOI in human rights, 
democracy and neutrality.  
xviiChandler (1992: 105) refers to 19th century client-patron relationships amongst 
officials as one of "consuming" and "eating" their clients, slaves and people. 
Cambodian folklore portrayed the elite or the patrons as "...tigers, crocodiles, and 
venomous snakes" in much the same way Khmer may talk of government officials 
today. 
xviii Little is published about the nature of crime in Theravada Buddhist societies and 
only limited temporal data is available to compare with other ASEAN countries. 
Thailand, however, does offer a comparative perspective, which suggests that the 
initial processes of modernisation provoke an increase in crime, including violent 
crime. The murder rate has fallen dramatically from the 1970s when intentional 
homicides were estimated to be 24-34 per 100,000 but stabilised toward the late 
1980s and in 2000 was reported to be 8.3 per 100,000. 
xix Without a crime victim survey, it is difficult to assess the extent that police 
statistics are an index crime.  
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xx MOI Judicial Police and medical officers, who participated in a medico-legal 
investigation course in May 1999, also provided valuable information on the scope 
and nature of homicide in Cambodia.  
xxi  Prison census data is provided by the Asian Pacific Correctional Association 
Conference: personal communication Mr. David Biles.  
xxii The population of Cambodia was estimated to be 10,824,244 as of mid year 1998 
(Central Bureau of Elections) and at end-of-year 1996 was estimated to be 10,300,000 
and 9,500,000 in 1993 (National Statistics Office). The demography shows a very 
young population and substantial imbalance in the sex ratio: women outnumber men 
in the older age groups (Huguet 1997). Age and sex rates are important in identifying 
trends and changes in offender and victim profiles but are unobtainable. The rates for 
1996 are adjusted for missing returns from remote provinces. 
xxiii The municipality of Pailin under Khmer Rouge control in 1996 was excluded 
because it was not within the jurisdiction of the RGC. The high rate for Seim Reap 
province arises from remanent KR banditry in the south-east and fishing disputes 
along the north-eastern shores of the Tonle Sap. The provincial centre and tourist 
town of Seim Reap enjoys relative tranquillity and has a rate lower than for the 
province as a whole. 
xxiv Investigative capability remains compromised and police are bereft of forensic 
scientific services.  
xxv A fuller account of the conduct of the coup d’etat is provided by Sorpong Peou 
(2000:298-305; 343-54) and the reasons behind it. Attempts by the first Prime 
Minister to neutralise CPP superior military strength may have precipitated action and 
the bloody coup cost over 50 lives. The defeated Funcinpec forces withdrew to the 
north-east where they continued to resist RGC forces until a political settlement was 
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reached late in 1998. 
xxvi As previously, noted Khmer are at least as reluctant to report crimes to police as 
other nationalities. However, it would appear in rural areas that this reluctance 
extends to serious crime including homicides. A study of customary dispute 
settlement undertaken in 1997 showed that although suspicious deaths are reported to 
commune officials they are often dealt without recourse to Judicial Police or the 
courts (Tarr 1998). It is probable some of these cases are not reported to National 
Judicial Police. 
xxvii  Police record serious offences and therefore UNCOHCHR suspicious death 
reports overlap with police murder records and are apparently not in addition to 
official murder counts [personal communication MOI]. 
xxviii For example, the UN body reported thirteen "killings", four alleged killings and 
three attempted killings linked to political intimidation in the four months prior to the 
1998 elections. The COHCHR also confirmed 76 of 189 serious allegations involved 
political motives. 
xxix For example the International Classification of Disease and World Health 
Organization E codes; see also US Department of Justice 1997. 
xxx The concept of modernisation is often synonymous in the ASEAN region with the 
problematic notion of “Westernisation” that implies the dual adoption of European 
technology and politico-cultural values. 
xxxi Caution is necessary in interpreting differences in homicide rates since differences 
occur across measures (ie. WHO, INTERPOL, UN), counting rules and definitions 
between nations. No data on homicide was available for Brunei, Bhutan and two 
important neighbours of Cambodia, Vietnam, and Laos. For further discussion about 
various cross-national measures of homicide, see Newman (1999:257). 
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xxxii  The socio-economic indicators reported in Table 5 are for 1997 as cited in 
Asiaweek, June 19, 1998.  
xxxiiiThe homicide rate in the US (sometimes described as a “weak” domestic state) 
has subsequently fallen to about 7 per 100,000 while the rate in Cambodia has 
increased. 
xxxiv  The INTERPOL homicide victim-based rate for the Philippines includes 
attempted homicides and manslaughter as reported in Table 5. This is not comparable 
with the data available for Cambodia that excludes attempts. Comparisons are thus 
drawn with national data based on “volume” that distinguishes between murder 
[intentional] and homicide [other lethal acts]: this source also provides data for 
Manila. 
xxxv Although armed robbery rates in Phnom Penh and Manila appear high, especially 
in the city, Australian rates of armed robbery [although usually not involving 
firearms] were in 1996 34.2 per 100,000, and 55.2 for unarmed robbery. Recorded 
theft rates are also much higher at 1714 for house break-ins, 671 for vehicle theft and 
2849 per 100,000 for other thefts (Australian Bureau of Statistics 1997). 
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